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1 Introduction 
 
Conclusion of an agreement is sometimes followed by unforeseen events occurring without 
fault of either party. The occurrence of such events may interfere in the performance or 
prevent the performance of the contractual obligations. This brings uncertainty as to the 
legal effect of such change of circumstances on rights and obligations of the parties and 
may even result in discharge of the contract in question.1 
 
In order to identify legal consequences of such extraordinary events, terms of the contract 
must be analyzed in the first place.2 Often, commercial parties reasonably contemplate such 
change of circumstances at the time of the contracting and even envisage legal consequenc-
es for these events. This is often achieved through the contractual risk allocation clauses.3 
 
Risk allocation clauses are particularly important in maritime shipping. One of the charac-
teristic features of the shipping business is that there are many external risks that may en-
danger the ships, their cargoes and cause delays and interruptions in the service of the 
ships.4 As a result, there is a need and tendency of allocating risks through various mecha-
                                                
 
1 Michael Furmston, Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract, sixteenth (Oxford university press, 
2012), 714. 
2 Ewan McKendrick, Contract Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, 2nd ed (Oxford [England]  ; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 878–880. 
3 Thomas Edward Scrutton, Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading, 22nd ed (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell Thomson Reuters, 2011), para. 1–089. 
4 Thor Falkanger, Scandinavian Maritime Law: The Norwegian Perspective, 3d ed (Oslo, Norway: 
Universitetsforlaget, 2011), para. 1–2. 
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nisms such as statutory rules allowing limitation of liability, insurance, general average and 
most importantly contractual clauses.5  
 
It is often argued in the legal literature that it is impossible to draft fully self-regulatory 
contract, which is completely isolated from the governing law.6 Thus, parties cannot merely 
rely on the wording of the contract, as the effect of the contractual provisions will largely 
depend on the governing law of the agreement. Governing law plays an important role in 
interpreting the contractual terms and determining their legal affect as well as regulating 
issues not covered by the agreement.7 Therefore, apart from contractual arrangements, the 
legal effect of the supervening events on contractual obligations largely depends on the law 
governing such obligations. The interesting point of observation is how the rules of govern-
ing law, on the one hand, and the contractual risk allocation clauses, on the other hand, 
interact and can influence the final outcome.  
 
If the event occurs rendering the obligations under the charterparty radically different from 
what was originally undertaken by the contracting parties, common law doctrine of frustra-
tion may discharge the contract.8 However, application of the doctrine of frustration em-
ploys extensive analysis of the facts of the case and terms of the contract.9 Charterparty risk 
allocation clauses may envisage number of supervening events and regulate consequences 
                                                
 
5 Ibid. 
6 Boilerplate Clauses, International Commercial Contracts and the Applicable Law (Cambridge  ; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 116–117. 
7 Guiditta Cordero Moss, Lectures on International Commercial Law, Publication Series of the Institute of 
Private Law, University of Oslo 162 (CEPMLP Internet Journal, 2003), 31–51; Marcel Fontaine, 
Drafting International Contracts: An Analysis of Contract Clauses (Ardsley, N.Y: Transnational 
Publishers, 2006), 439–451. 
8 Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council (House of Lords 1956); Time Charters, 6th ed, 
Lloyd’s Shipping Law Library (London: Informa, 2008), para. 26.4. 
9 Edwinton Commercial Corporation and Global Tradeways Ltd v Tsavliris Russ (Worldwide Salvage and 
Towage) Ltd “Sea Angel,” 2 Lloyd’s Rep 517 (English  Court of Appeal 2007). 
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of their occurrence. If this is the case, then the application of the doctrine might be prevent-
ed due to contractual regulation. 
 
In light of the above, it can be concluded that, both the contractual provisions and govern-
ing law is to be taken into consideration to determine whether the supervening events in 
question can result in total discharge of obligations under the charterparty or merely sus-
pend or otherwise modify them.  
 
 
1.1 Research Question and its Practical Relevance 
 
This thesis aims to determine whether and under what circumstances can supervening 
events, occurring subsequent to concluding the time charterparty, result in the discharge of 
the contract by frustration. 
 
Scholarly writings as well as case law demonstrate, that mere fact that supervening events 
occur without the fault of the parties affecting or preventing performance of the contract is 
not sufficient to bring doctrine of frustration into operation. Change in circumstances has to 
be radical.10  
 
Although, doctrine of frustration is quite antique, limits of this doctrine are difficult to 
define.11 It has been often criticized for being artificial and even that it “may have caused 
more problems than it was intended to solve.''12  
                                                
 
10 G. H Treitel, Frustration and Force Majeure (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004), para. 1–003; Davis 
Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council (House of Lords 1956); National Carriers Ltd v 
Panalpina (Northern) Ltd (House of Lords 1981). 
11 Ewan McKendrick, Force Majeure and Frustration of Contract (London; New York: Lloyd’s of London 
Press, 1995), 35; Marel Katsivela, “Contraacts: Force Majeure Concept or Force Majeure Clauses?” 
(2007), 109.  
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Based on the above, it can be concluded that uncertainty is inherent feature of the doctrine 
of frustration,13 this hinders commercial certainty and predictability,14 which is so crucial 
for the parties involved in the shipping business. Therefore, it is important to outline the 
elements of the doctrine, identify when is it invoked by the courts and what consequences 
does it have for the parties to the agreement. Also, whether and how the parties can avoid 
such consequences if they decide to do so. 
 
Parties often contract out possible causes of frustration by incorporating force majeure and 
or similar risk allocation clauses.15 Therefore, thesis will also assess the effect of the con-
tractual force majeure clauses and in particular, interrelation of these clauses with the frus-
tration doctrine. It will be demonstrated that sufficiently drafted force majeure clause can 
avoid application of the doctrine of frustration. However, considering the factual circum-
stances of the case, courts may nevertheless consider that despite the all embracing word-
ing of the force majeure clause, the event occurred might not be of a dimension for which 
parties reasonably intended to assume the risk for.16 
 
Force majeure as a concept in the common law exists only to the extent that the parties 
incorporate it into a contract.17Therefore, it will be demonstrated that wording of the clause 
and its interpretation will determine the legal effect of such clause.18 
                                                                                                                                               
 
12 Fengming Liu, “The Doctrine of Frustration: An Overview of English Law” 19, no. 2 (April 2, 1988): 
285–286. 
13 McKendrick, Force Majeure and Frustration of Contract, 38–39. 
14 Scottish Navigation Co. Ltd. v W. A. Souter & Co. (King’s Bench division 1917); Bank Line v Arthur 
Capel & Co (Court of Appeals 1919). 
15 Bremer Handelsgesellschaft m.b.H v. J. H. Rayner & Co. LTD., 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 73 (Queen’s Bench 
Division (Commercial Court) 1978). 
16 Metropolitan Water Board v Dick Kerr and Co Ltd (House of Lords 1918). 
17 Treitel, Frustration and Force Majeure, para. 12–021; McKendrick, Force Majeure and Frustration of 
Contract, 3–5. 
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Shipping business is largely international and maritime law is correspondingly an area of 
law that has developed in an international setting.19 Anglo-American law has played an 
important role in the development of the standard charterparty forms,20 therefore English 
law is an important consideration when certain issues are dealt with under the charterparty, 
even when the contract is not governed by the English law.21 The ruling of the Norwegian 
Supreme Court in Sunvitor22 serves as a good example for the above. In the said case, the 
Norwegian Supreme Court decided that English law could be used as background law also 
when Norwegian law was applicable to a contract. In a later case, Arica23 arbitrators attest-
ed to the same.  
 
Swedish Supreme court in cases NJA 1954 s. 574 and NJA 1971 s. 47424 further confirms 
that even if English law does not apply to the charterparty, the construction of the relevant 
clause might take into consideration the understanding of such clauses in English law, 
which has particular relevance in respect of charter parties. 
 
The above demonstrates relevance of the English law for the charterparties, understanding 
of which is important even in case the contract is subjected to civil governing law.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
 
18 Marel Katsivela, “Contracts: Force Majeure Concept or Force Majeure Clauses?,” 110; Great Elephant 
Corp v Trafigura Beheer BV, the “CRUDESKY,” Lloyds’ Law Reposrter (2013). 
19 Falkanger, Scandinavian Maritime Law, para. 1.2; Proshanto K Mukherjee, Mark Brownrigg, and Bruce 
Farthing, Farthing on International Shipping (Berlin; London: Springer, 2013), 1. 
20 Falkanger, Scandinavian Maritime Law, 366. 
21 Ibid. 
22 ND 1974.103.NH “Sunvictor” 
23 ND 1983.309.NV «Arica'' 
24 Juergen Basedow, The Hamburg Lectures on Maritime Affairs, 2009 & 2010, 1st ed, Hamburg Studies on 
Maritime Affairs 6888 (New York: Springer, 2012), 44. 
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Considering the importance of English law, present research will be limited to the 
frustration of time charterparties and assessment of the legal affect of the force majeure 
clauses under English law. However, several examples will be provided from other civil 
jurisdictions for illustrative purposes only, to ensure better understanding of relevant legal 
concepts within the scope of the present research.  
 
The reason of limiting the scope of the study to time charterparties is determined by the 
number of reasons. Shipping cases dealing with the delay, interruption of charter service or 
destruction of the ship have substantially contributed to the development of the doctrine of 
frustration.25 Time charter is a service contract “under which the ship’s capacity is made 
available to a time charterer for a specified period.”26  The charterer is free to employ the 
vessel for his own purposes within the permitted contractual limits.27 One of the 
characteristics of the time charterparties is that they are concluded for a fixed period of 
time rather than for a particular voyage, thus parties do not contemplate definite adventure 
in the time charterparty.  Therefore, it is difficult to define whether the supervening event is 
of such a nature as to frustrate commercial purpose of the contract and destroy the 
''common object'' of the parties.28 
  
1.2 Methodology and Legal Sources 
 
This thesis is based on the analytical research method and aims to critically evaluate the 
relevant legal issue within the identified scope. The aim of the paper is to outline main 
                                                
 
25 Liu, “The Doctrine of Frustration: An Overview of English Law,” 264. 
26 Thor Falkanger, Scandinavian Maritime Law: The Norwegian Perspective, 3d ed (Oslo, Norway: 
Universitetsforlaget, 2011), 417. 
27 John Furness Wilson, Carriage of Goods by Sea, 7th ed (New York: Pearson/Longman, 2010), para. 1.1. 
28 Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract, 722; Bank Line v Arthur Capel & Co (Court of 
Appeals 1919); Hirji Mulji v Cheong Yue Steamship Co (Court of Appeals 1926); FA Tamplin 
Steamship Co, Ltd v Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Products Co, Ltd (House of Lords 1916). 
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shortcomings of the doctrine of frustration by analyzing selected aspects of the problem 
and to assess whether the available solutions are sufficient to eliminate the shortcomings.  
 
The primary legal source for conducting the research was the case law, which was analyzed 
within the scope of the legal problem. The thesis relies upon a body of case law establish-
ing rules of general application in English law of contracts as well as rulings of English 
courts particularly concerned with frustration of time charterparties.  
 
Thesis also relies on scholarly writings as a secondary source, relevant for acquiring back-
ground information about the topic, as well as for identifying the legal controversies on the 
research question.  
 
 
1.3 Structure 
 
This thesis comprises of four parts. The first part presents the short introduction of the re-
search question and its practical relevance. Also scope and aim of the research, methodolo-
gy of research study and legal sources used.  
 
Second part presents the analysis of the legal basis of the English doctrine of frustration. 
Namely, this part covers nature, effect and elements of the doctrine, as well as legal aspects 
of its operation.  
 
The third part deals with the force majeure clauses, their nature, effect and interrelation 
with the frustration doctrine. This chapter also presents comparative analysis of the two 
concepts – force majeure and frustration. 
 
The last chapter summarizes the findings and presents concluding remarks on the research 
question.  
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2 Doctrine of Frustration  
 
Present chapter analyses the doctrine of frustration. Namely, the essence of the doctrine, it's 
legal effect and the conditions to be fulfilled for invoking the doctrine will be discussed. 
Factors excluding application of the doctrine will also be addressed. The aim of this chapter 
is to identify controversies about the legal bases of the doctrine, as well as demonstrate 
complexity of its application.  
 
 
2.1 Nature and Effect of the Doctrine 
 
When extraordinary events occur, without the default of either of the parties, subsequent to 
the formation of the charterparty and these events radically and significantly alter the na-
ture of the contractual rights and obligations of the parties,29 the contract may be automati-
cally brought to an end by operation of the doctrine of frustration.30 Alteration has to be 
such as to “destroy the identity of the charter service or to make it, as a matter of business, 
a totally different thing.”31  
 
Operation and effects of the doctrine does not depend on the action, inaction or will of the 
parties to continue the contract.32 As stated above, it brings the contract automatically to an 
end notwithstanding the fact that parties might continue to perform their contractual 
                                                
 
29 Treitel, Frustration and Force Majeure, para. 1–001; Scrutton, Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of 
Lading, para. 1–089; Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council (House of Lords 1956); 
National Carriers Ltd v Panalpina (Northern) Ltd (House of Lords 1981). 
30 Liu, “The Doctrine of Frustration: An Overview of English Law,” 271. 
31 Time Charters, para. 26.4. 
32 Hirji Mulji v Cheong Yue Steamship Co (Court of Appeals 1926). 
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obligations. With respect to time charterparty for instance, if considered as frustrated, the 
time charterparty will be discharged even if the charterer continues to pay hire for the 
ship.33 In Hirji Mulji v Cheong Yue Steamship Co.,34 Privy Council considered the time 
charterparty frustrated by the requisitioning of the ship, irrespective of the fact that the 
parties have agreed (subsequent to the requisition) that the charterer would take the ship 
after her release. 
 
If frustrated, the contract is not void ab initio, but only from the moment of frustration.35 
Parties are released from their obligations that are due after the frustrating event, however 
they still remain responsible for those obligations, which arose before such event.36 
 
Prior to introducing the doctrine of frustration under English law, the rule of absolute con-
tracts, as laid down in Paradine v Jane37 by the Court of King's Bench was applied.  Ac-
cording to this rule, when the party binds himself by contract “absolutely to do a thing”, he 
cannot escape liability.38 However, case law gradually mitigated the effects of this harsh 
rule,39 giving effect to the demands of the justice.40 The Taylor v Cardwell41 is generally 
                                                
 
33 Bank Line v Arthur Capel & Co (Court of Appeals 1919). 
34 Hirji Mulji v Cheong Yue Steamship Co (Court of Appeals 1926). 
35 Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract, 731; Liu, “The Doctrine of Frustration: An Overview 
of English Law,” 262; Treitel, Frustration and Force Majeure, para. 15–002. 
36 McKendrick, Contract Law, 902–921; Hirji Mulji v Cheong Yue Steamship Co (Court of Appeals 1926); 
Chandler v Webster (Court of Appeals 1904). 
37 Paradine v Jane (King’s Bench division 1647). 
38 Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract, 714; Treitel, Frustration and Force Majeure, para. 2–
001; McKendrick, Contract Law, 868.Liu, “The Doctrine of Frustration: An Overview of English Law,” 
263. 
39 Taylor v Caldwell (Court of Appeal 1863); Paul Krell v CS Henry (King’s Bench 1903). 
40 McKendrick, Contract Law, 867–868; Lauritzen A.S. v Wijsmuller B.V. (THE “SUPER SERVANT 
TWO”), 1 Lloyd’s Rep 148 (House of Lords 1989); Time Charters, para. 26–5. 
41 Taylor v Caldwell (Court of Appeal 1863). 
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considered to have established the modern doctrine of discharge by supervening events, 
doctrine of frustration.42  
 
As a matter of general feature of this doctrine, it must be noted, that mere hardship or in-
convenience would not be sufficient to justify discharge by frustration,43 “[t]here must be 
as well such a change in the significance of the obligation that the thing undertaken would, 
if performed, be a different thing from that contracted for.”44 Legal scholars confirm that, 
courts would not apply the doctrine of frustration unless they conclude that to hold the par-
ties bound, in the light of the altered circumstances, would change the fundamental nature 
of the contract.45  
 
Doctrine of frustration is not a remedy for the consequences of bad commercial bargains,46 
it operates within a very narrow limits and is not easily to be invoked.47 Parties have to find 
themselves committed to radically different obligations from that they originally contem-
plated for.48 
 
When referring to radically different obligations, it shall be noted that heavier financial 
burden will not be considered to substantially alter parties’ contractual obligations.49 As it 
was held in Occidental v. Skibs A/S Avanti: “The fact that [...] ships were chartered during 
a boom period when rates were high, which was then followed by a period of depression 
                                                
 
42 Treitel, Frustration and Force Majeure, para. 2–001; 2–022–2–038. 
43 Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract, 716. 
44 Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council (House of Lords 1956). 
45 Time Charters, para. 26.49; Tsakiroglou & Co. Ltd. v. Noblee and Thorl GmbH (House of Lords 1962); 
Ocean Tramp Tankers Corporation v V/O Sovfracht ,The Eugenia (Court of Appeal 1964). 
46 Treitel, Frustration and Force Majeure, 2–036; Pioneer Shipping Ltd v BTP Tioxide Ltd (The Nema) 
(House of Lords 1982). 
47 McKendrick, Contract Law, 867-878; Treitel, Frustration and Force Majeure, para. 2–037. 
48 Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract, 715. 
49 Time Charters, para. 26.48. 
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during the currency of the charters, is a normal phenomenon of the fluctuations to which 
the tanker market is ordinarily subject from time to time.”50 Hence, context of commercial 
relationship is relevant when identifying whether the change in circumstances can be 
considered radical as opposed to more onerous and burdensome.  
 
The economic consequences of the frustration is that ''losses lie where they fall.''51 Advance 
payments if already paid, shall not be reimbursed.52 This was attested in Lloyd Royal v. 
Stathatos, 53 where the Court of Appeal rejected the charterers’ claim for the return of hire 
paid in advance. This approach was deviated from in Fibrosa v. Fairbairn.54 The House of 
Lords allowed reimbursement of the advance payment to the extent of the full absence of 
the consideration. Nevertheless, this is considered to be a very rare case in practice.55  
 
The consequences of the doctrine, has been modified by the Law Reform (Frustrated 
Contracts) Act 1943 (the “Act”).56 The Act only regulates subsequent rights of the parties 
to the frustrated contract.57 A right of recovery of already paid or payable hire falls within 
the scope of the Act. Notably, the Act applies to time charter parties while voyage 
charterparties as well as bills of lading are expressly excluded from the scope of its 
application. Details of this regulation will not be further discussed in the paper, as the Act 
deals with the subsequent rights of the parties, while the thesis is focused on the 
circumstances in which the contract can be deemed frustrated. Therefore, allocation of 
losses following the frustration of the contract falls well beyond the scope of this study.   
 
                                                
 
50 Occidental v. Skibs A/S Avanti, 1 Lloyd’s Rep 293 (Queen’s Bench 1976). 
51 Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council (House of Lords 1956). 
52 Time Charters, para. 26.59. 
53 Lloyd Royal Belge SA v Stathatos, 30 Great Britain Times Law Reports 70 (1917). 
54 Fibrosa Spolka v Fairbairn (Court of Appeals 1943). 
55 Time Charters, para. 15.1. 
56 McKendrick, Contract Law, 904–906; Time Charters, para. 26.60 –26.62 . 
57 Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract, 735–742; Time Charters, para. 26.60–26.62. 
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2.2 Operation of the Doctrine 
 
It is not possible to predefine or classify specific circumstances to which the doctrine of 
frustration will apply.58  
 
As often noted in the legal literature, application of the doctrine of frustration is the ques-
tion of fact and law. For instance, the question whether delay in general or particular delay 
is capable of frustrating the contract is a matter of law, but the question whether, actually 
experienced delay is of sufficient length to cause frustration is a matter of fact.59 Notably, it 
is sometimes hard to make such distinction between the issues of fact and that of the law.60 
 
In Edwinton Commercial Corporation v Tsavliris Russ61 the Court of Appeal held that ap-
plication of the doctrine requires “multi-factorial” approach and the factors that need to be 
considered are terms of the contract, their context, matrix of facts, parties reasonable ex-
pectations and especially their knowledge, assumptions and contemplations regarding the 
particular risk.  
 
Therefore, application of the doctrine often constitutes a difficult task for the courts and 
arbitrators. One of the decisive elements when applying the doctrine is the test of “radically 
different” obligations. This test implies that “there has to be [...] a break in identity be-
                                                
 
58 Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract, 719. 
59 Time Charters, para. 26.11; National Carriers Ltd v Panalpina (Northern) Ltd (House of Lords 1981); 
Universal Cargo Carriers Corp. v Citati, 1 Lloyd’s Rep 174 (Queen’s Bench 1957). 
60 Treitel, Frustration and Force Majeure, para. 16–002. 
61 Edwinton Commercial Corporation and Global Tradeways Ltd v Tsavliris Russ (Worldwide Salvage and 
Towage) Ltd “Sea Angel,” 2 Lloyd’s Rep 517 (English  Court of Appeal 2007). 
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tween the contract as provided for and contemplated and its performance in the new cir-
cumstances.”62 
 
Thus, complex analysis of facts and terms of the contract is required when applying the 
doctrine, which justifies the above suggestion that no predefined test can exist to identify 
when the doctrine will operate.  
 
 
2.3 Common Causes of Frustration 
 
Having said that the threshold for invoking the doctrine is rather high, this assertion has to 
be further confirmed by addressing relevant causes of frustration. Therefore, present 
section will illustrate how the courts, faced with the respective cause of frustration, actually 
have applied the doctrine in practice. 
 
One can only provide for the non-exhaustive list of the circumstances that can bring the 
doctrine into operation.63 Such circumstances can be frustration of purpose,64 supervening 
illegality or change in law,65 death, illness or incapacity of a person.66 However, most 
complex and controversial causes of frustration, particularly relevant for time charterparties 
are: impossibility, delay and interruption.67 Practical difficulty with these causes of 
frustration is that their duration and effects can hardly be predictable and therefore factual 
                                                
 
62 Ibid. 
63 Liu, “The Doctrine of Frustration: An Overview of English Law,” 267. 
64 Paul Krell v CS Henry (King’s Bench 1903); Herne Bay Steamboat Co v Hutton (Court of Appeal 1903). 
65 Treitel, Frustration and Force Majeure, para. 8.001–8.055. 
66 Joseph Chitty, Chitty on Contracts, 29th ed, The Common Law Library (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2004), para. 23–020–23–055. 
67 Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract, 721; Metropolitan Water Board v Dick Kerr and Co 
Ltd (House of Lords 1918). 
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and legal assessment of these causes is more complex.68 Therefore, following sections will 
address the impossibility, delay and interruption as the causes of frustration.  
  
2.3.1 Impossibility 
 
Supervening impossibility of performance may discharge the obligations of the parties if it 
is sufficiently serious to cause this effect. Same applies to the partial or temporary 
impossibility.69 Since there is no such concept as partial or temporary frustration, the 
contract is either frustrated or remains in force.70 However, this does not necessarily apply 
in case when the charterparty can be separated in distinct and severable voyages.71  
Separable contract can be described as one, dealing with: “[...] wholly distinct, separate, 
and severable adventures between which there was no interdependence in the sense that 
the carrying out of any one of them was made to depend in any way upon the carrying out 
or abandonment of any of the others”.72 In the Dominion Coal v. Roberts,73 which 
concerned seven-year time charter with an option to extend to ten years, contract was 
considered to be indivisible and it was held that the requisition of the ship for the first three 
years either frustrated the whole charter or none of it. 
 
Destruction of the subject matter of the contract is the most obvious situation when perfor-
mance becomes impossible and the contract is discharged.74 Furthermore, contract may be 
discharged where the subject matter of the contract becomes unavailable for the purpose of 
performance, when it is no longer at the disposal of the parties.75 
                                                
 
68 McKendrick, Force Majeure and Frustration of Contract, 123–138.  
69 Treitel, Frustration and Force Majeure, para. 3–001, 3–002, 3–003. 
70 Ibid., Paul Krell v CS Henry (King’s Bench 1903). 
71 Time Charters, para. 26.12. 
72 BTP Tioxide Ltd v Pioneer Shipping Ltd, The Nema, 2 Lloyd’s Rep 339 (Court of Appeals 1982). 
73 Dominio Coal Company, Ltd. v. Roberts and others, 4 Lloyd’s Rep 434 (1920). 
74 Taylor v Caldwell (Court of Appeal 1863). 
75 Treitel, Frustration and Force Majeure, 4–002. 
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Thus, identification of the subject matter of the charterparty is necessary. Ship is regarded 
to be the subject-matter of the agreement for time and voyage charters, as these contracts 
are the type of service contracts to be performed by use of the specified ship.76  
 
Therefore, given that the ship is the subject matter of the time charter contract, 
impossibility would arise and time charter will be frustrated by the actual total loss of the 
chartered ship, or if the ship is “so badly damaged that she has effectively been destroyed 
as a commercial ship or rendered unfit for the charter with no prospect of being made 
again fit.”77  
 
Where the loss of the chartered ship is the cause of frustration of the charter, any clause 
permitting the substitution of another ship will not prevent frustration, unless parties incor-
porate clear provision allowing substitution after the loss of the ship.78 In Niarchos (Lon-
don), Ltd. v. Shell Tankers, Ltd.79, the seven-year time charter incorporated a clause giving 
her owners the right to substitute chartered ship with the larger one. During the charter ser-
vice the ship ran aground and became a total loss. Court held that as the time charter had 
been frustrated by the total loss of the ship and her owners no longer had a right to make a 
substitution 
 
A charterparty may also be frustrated when the ship is detained and hence becomes una-
vailable for the performance of the contract.80 This is illustrated by the number of cases 
                                                
 
76 Ibid., 4–004. 
77 Blane Steamships v. Minister of Transport, 2 Lloyd’s Rep 155 (Court of Appeals 1951); Time Charters, 
para. 26.14 . 
78 Time Charters, para. 26.15. 
79 Niarchos (London), Ltd. v. Shell Tankers, Ltd., 2 Lloyd’s Rep 496 (Queen’s Bench 1961). 
80 Treitel, Frustration and Force Majeure, para. 4–003. 
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initiated as a result of the Gulf War between Iran and Iraq.81 In these cases, the prolonged 
detention of ships, which had been time-chartered had the effect of discharging the con-
tracts.  
  
2.3.2 Delay and Interruption  
 
Number of cases have addressed the question whether the contract has been frustrated by 
the delay and interruption. However the results reached are not particularly clear and con-
sistent. The courts analyze various factors to establish that the delay is of the dimension to 
frustrate the contracts. These elements will be discussed in the sections immediately fol-
lowing below.  
 
2.3.2.1 Delay as a Cause of Frustration 
 
In order for a delay to frustrate a contract its effect must be radical.82 As it was suggested in 
Tatem v. Gamboa: “if the foundation of the contract goes [...] by reason of such long 
interruption or delay that the performance is really in effect that of a different contract, 
[...] contact is regarded as frustrated.”83 
 
Length and effect of the delay was ground for frustration in Lloyd Royal Belge SA v Statha-
tos.84 The case concerned a time charter for “one round trip Gibraltar to the States” which 
entitled the charterers to cancel the contract if the ship was not delivered by December 10. 
                                                
 
81 Kodros Shipping Corporation v. Empresa Cubana De Fletes (The Evia), Lloyd’s Rep. 334 (Court of 
Appeal 1982).; Kissavos Shipping Co. S.A v. Empressa Cubana De Fletes  (THE “AGATHON”), 
Lloyd’s Rep. 211 (Court of Appeal 1982).; International Sea Tankers Inc v. Hemisphere Shipping Co. 
Ltd. (The “Wenjiang” (No. 2)), 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 400 (Queen’s Bench Division (Commercial Court) 
1982).; Vinava Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Finelvet A.G., Lloyd’s Rep 503 (QBD 1982). 
82 Time Charters, para. 26.17 . 
83 Tatem ltd v Gamboa, 61 Lloyd’s Rep 149 (King’s Bench Division 1938). 
84 Lloyd Royal Belge SA v Stathatos, 30 Great Britain Times Law Reports 70 (1917). 
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The ship was detained by the Admiralty on December 2, and not released till the following 
February 10. The charterparty was held to be discharged, as there had been “such interrup-
tion of the common object of the parties as to amount to frustration of the common adven-
ture.”85 
 
The delay as a cause of frustration was also discussed in a pivotal case of Bank Line Ltd v 
Arthur Capel & C.86 The vessel was time chartered for one year on a charterparty made on 
February 16, 1915. The charter period was to run from the time when the ship was placed 
at the charterer's disposal, which was contemplated to happen on April of 1915. The ship 
was not delivered within the contractually agreed time and was subsequently requisitioned 
by the government in May 1915. She was not released until September 1915. The House of 
Lords held that the contract had been frustrated by the requisition as the postponement of 
the commencement date of the charter was thought to last for an indefinite period.  
 
This decision is criticized for the following reasons: delay did not seem to interfere with the 
use of the ship but on the contrary, charterer was the one who was seeking to enforce the 
contract. The shipowner's real motive for arguing frustration seems to have been increased 
freight rates on the market. Therefore, shipowner in fact profited from the discharge, which 
is why this ruling is often criticized as being improper application of the doctrine of 
discharge.87  
 
There are however certain special factors in the case, which indicate that the shipowner 
would have been prejudiced, had the contract remained in force. Most important factor 
concerns the length of the requisition. It was uncertain how long the detention would last. 
Time of the commencement of the charterparty was to run from the time at which the ship 
was placed at the disposal of the charterer. At the time of the requisition the ship had not 
                                                
 
85 Treitel, Frustration and Force Majeure, 5–040. 
86 Bank Line v Arthur Capel & Co (Court of Appeals 1919). 
87 Treitel, Frustration and Force Majeure, para. 5.046-5.047. 
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yet been placed at his disposal. Hence, had the contract remained in force, it would have 
restricted shipowner's freedom to dispose of the ship for an indefinite time.88  
 
The above case has to be compared with Modern Transport Co Ltd v Duneric Steamship 
Co,89 where a ship, which had been chartered for 12 months, was placed at the charterer's 
disposal and was then requisitioned for five and a half months. It was held that the contract 
remained in force. The crucial fact distinguishing this case from the Bank Line case is that, 
when the requisition took effect, there was no doubt as to the time at which the period of 12 
months specified in the charterparty would expire. Hence, there was no such uncertainty, 
which was likely to cause prejudice to the shipowner.90 Another special factor (although 
not decisive) in the Bank Line Ltd v Arthur Capel & C., which was considered by the court, 
is that in June 1915 both parties regarded the contract as at an end and shipowners seem to 
have acted in reliance on this shared view. Thus, the final result in the Bank Line Ltd v Ar-
thur Capel & C case can be justified by reference to special factors listed above.91  
 
In certain cases however, the courts did not consider that particular delay was sufficient to 
have frustrating effect, especially in cases where the result of the delay has been no more 
than extra expense for the owners or the charterers.92  
 
Good example would be the case Ocean Tramp Tankers v. Sovfracht,93 where the ship was 
time chartered for a trip from Genoa to India via the Black Sea. Before the terms of the 
charter were fixed the parties, who were aware of the danger of the Suez Canal being 
                                                
 
88 Ibid. 
89 Modern Transport Co Ltd v Duneric Steamship Co (King’s Bench Division 1917). 
90 Treitel, Frustration and Force Majeure, 5–047. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Time Charters, para. 26.19 ; Edwinton Commercial Corporation and Global Tradeways Ltd v Tsavliris 
Russ (Worldwide Salvage and Towage) Ltd “Sea Angel,” 2 Lloyd’s Rep 517 (English  Court of Appeal 
2007). 
93 Ocean Tramp Tankers Corporation v V/O Sovfracht ,The Eugenia (Court of Appeal 1964). 
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closed, included the printed War Clause in the charterparty. The ship entered the Canal and 
was trapped there. It was held by the Court of Appeal that the charterers were in breach of 
the War Clause in allowing the ship to enter the Canal, thus they could not rely on self-
induced frustration. The fact that the ship would, if not trapped, have had to proceed around 
the Cape to India did not frustrate the charter because the cargo was not perishable and the 
prolongation (138 days from delivery to redelivery against 108 days) was not so significant 
to make the voyage around the Cape radically different. Most importantly, the only real 
difference was that the voyage became considerably more expensive and this was not a 
ground for regarding the contract as frustrated.94 
 
2.3.2.2 Strike and War as Interruption  
 
Strikes in general are of uncertain duration and they will not usually frustrate a charter.95 
Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a strike having this effect in appropriate 
circumstances.96 Decisive factor for frustrating the charterparty is the effect that strike will 
have on the performance of the contract: "It is not the nature of the cause of delay which 
matters so much as the effect of that cause upon the performance of the obligations which 
the parties have assumed one towards the other.”97 
 
Whether the outbreak of war (apart from cases of illegality) would cause frustration would 
depend upon its effects on the charter.98 Wars vary greatly in their intensity and geographic 
                                                
 
94 Time Charters, para. 26.19. 
95 Pioneer Shipping Ltd v BTP Tioxide Ltd (The Nema) (House of Lords 1982); Reardon Smith Line, Ltd. 
v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, 1 Lloyd’s Rep 385 (Court of Appeal 1961). 
96 Time Charters, para. 26.40; John Furness Wilson, Carriage of Goods by Sea, 5th ed (Harlow, England  ; 
New York: Pearson/Longman, 2004), 40.; McKendrick, Force Majeure and Frustration of Contract, 88–
91,  123-138 
97 Pioneer Shipping Ltd v BTP Tioxide Ltd (The Nema) (House of Lords 1982). 
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scope. Some may be expected to have a devastating effect on a particular charter while 
others might affect it slightly or not at all.99 
 
As it is stated in Finelvet AG v. Vinava Shipping Co Ltd,100 declaration of war does not 
prevent the performance of a contract. It is the acts done in furtherance of the war, which 
may prevent performance, depending on the individual circumstances of the case.  
 
Good demonstration of this statement is Kodros Shipping Corporation v. Empresa Cubana 
De Fletes101 where the ship was time chartered for 18 months and was due to be 
redelivered on May 20, 1981. On September 22, 1980 war broke out between Iraq and Iran 
and hostilities in the area of the Shatt-al-Arab prevented the sailing of the ship. However, 
the Court of Appeal held that charter was frustrated not on the date when the war broke out, 
but on 4 October, when it became obvious that the ship would be affected by the war. 
 
2.3.2.3 Proportionality Test 
 
If the delay lasts, or is likely to last, for so long that no part of the agreed performance can 
be rendered, the contract will be discharged.102 In Gulf War cases, were time-chartered 
ships were detained for long-periods, contracts were frustrated and consequently charterers 
ceased to be liable for hire as soon as it became clear that the detention would extend be-
yond the period of the charterparties.103 Herewith, when the delay appears at first to be like-
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ly to be of short duration the contract will be frustrated if, and as soon as, it appears that the 
delay will be extraordinarily lengthy.104  
 
In cases when some performance of the contract is still possible, the test used by the courts 
is proportionality test, which assesses the relation between the unexpired balance of the 
charter period at the time of the alleged frustration to the whole contract.105 As it was noted 
in Anglo-Northern v. Jones: “[t]he main consideration is the probable length of the total 
deprivation of use of the vessel as compared with the unexpired portion of the charterpar-
ty.”  
 
The same test was applied in FA Tamplin Steamship Co, Ltd v Anglo-Mexican Petroleum 
Products Co. Ltd.106 A tanker was chartered for five years and when the charterparty still 
had nearly three years to run, the ship was requisitioned during the First World War. Ship's 
owners claimed that the contract was frustrated. In the view of the majority, the proportion 
of the part, which might have been performed, was sufficiently large as compared to the 
original contract. There would be several months during which this ship would be available 
for commercial purposes before expiration of the charterparty. Although the period of the 
requisition was indefinite, there was a sufficient chance for the ship to be available for fur-
ther service under the charter before its expiry.107 Therefore, the charterparty was not con-
sidered to be frustrated.  
 
                                                
 
104 Time Charters, para. 26.47; International Sea Tankers Inc. v. Hemisphere Shipping Co. Ltd. (The 
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The decision of the House of Lords in FA Tamplin Steamship Co, Ltd v Anglo-Mexican 
Petroleum Products Co, Ltd. should, however, be treated considering special circumstances 
of that case. Important factor of this case is that it was the owners who claimed that the 
contract was discharged. Had their claim succeeded, they would have gained a windfall 
profit: compensation paid by the Government, which exceeded the hire payable under the 
charterparty. Thus, it can be concluded that if the admiralty compensation had been lower 
than the hire and the charterers had refused to continue with the charter the decision of the 
House of Lords might have been different.108 The ruling in FA Tamplin Steamship Co, Ltd 
v Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Products Co, Ltd was upheld by Court of Appeal in Modern 
Transport Co Ltd v Duneric SS Co,109 where the case concerned the time charter for 12 
months. The court held that the requisition was for less than half the period of the time 
charter and this was not sufficient to bring the charterparty to an end. 
 
2.3.2.4 Assessment of the Extent of Interruption 
 
The length and effect of the interruption must be assessed at the time when it occurs.110 In 
Anglo-Northern v. Jones111 the rule was established as follows: “the parties must have the 
right to claim that the charterparty is terminated by frustration as soon as the event upon 
which the claim is based happens. The question will then be what estimate would a 
reasonable man of business take of the probable length of the withdrawal of the vessel from 
service […] and it will be immaterial whether his anticipation is justified or falsified by the 
event.” 
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In Court Line v. Dant & Russell,112 ship was trapped due to the War between Japan and 
China and it was expected that she would be prevented from sailing down river 
indefinitely, which consequently did not prove to be correct. Notwithstanding this fact, the 
charter was considered to be frustrated. 
 
Likewise, in BTP Tioxide Ltd v Pioneer Shipping Ltd,113Court of Appeals dismissed as 
irrelevant the fact that the strike unexpectedly ended only nine days after the arbitrator had 
decided that it had frustrated the charter. 
 
Thus, regarding the assessment of the delay and interruption it can be concluded that the 
cause of frustration is the delay/interruption, rather than the event causing such 
delay/interruption and therefore, frustration has to be judged in the light of expectations 
assessed retrospectively rather than objectively in the light of the information available at 
the time of trial.114  
 
 
2.4 Factors Excluding Frustration  
 
Having discussed the concept and common causes of the doctrine, it is important to outline 
that parties cannot always rely on the doctrine of frustration when occurring supervening 
events satisfy the “test of radically different”. Therefore, following sections will address 
the cases when the parties are excluded to invoke the doctrine of frustration. 
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2.4.1 Self-induced Frustration 
 
The essence of the frustration is that it shall not be the result of an omission of a positive 
act, subject to certain limitations.115 It should not be due to the deliberate act or election of 
the party seeking to rely on it.116 
 
Omission will frustrate the contract only when there is duty to act, which does not extend 
beyond what is reasonable, as demonstrated by the case below. 
 
In the Bank Line case,117 the shipowners could have secured the early release of the ship, 
which had been requisitioned if they had offered to provide a substitute vessel to the 
respective authorities, but the House of Lords held that they were under no duty to take 
such step.  As it can be inferred from the decision, the reason why no such duty existed is 
that the efforts required from the shipowners, for securing early release of the ship were 
unreasonable.   
 
Frustration might be considered to be self-induced where it is due to the “act” or “election” 
of the party claiming the discharge. This might be the case for instance, when party enters 
into number of contracts and is prevented to perform one or some of them.118 It is suggest-
ed in the legal literature, that the element of “election” is not present when it is the law that 
determines which contract is to be discharged, as opposed to the party itself.119 
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The leading case on the self-induced frustration is Lauritzen A.S. v Wijsmuller B.V (The 
Super Servant Two).120 The respondents had to transport oil-drilling rig from Japan to Rot-
terdam, using one of their two ships Super Servant One or Super Servant Two. Respond-
ents selected Super Servant Two to perform the voyage. However the selected ship sunk 
while performing another contact. Respondents claimed frustration due to the destruction 
of the ship. In the view of the Court of Appeal, as the defendants had a choice to select the 
ship for performing the voyage, alleged frustrating event was caused by their own act – the 
choice to perform voyage with Super Servant Two and not by a supervening event. There-
fore they could not rely on the frustration doctrine.  The Court of Appeal held that it was 
irrelevant that the defendants could no allocate Super Servant One to perform all of con-
cluded contracts as “it is within the promisor's own control how many contracts he enters 
into and the risk should be his.”121  
 
This ruling has been described as a harsh decision.122 Two practical steps could have been 
taken to avoid such result: had the contract indicated that it should have been performed 
with Super Servant Two, the sinking of that vessel, without negligence on the part of the 
defendants, would have entitled the defendants to seek relief under the doctrine of frustra-
tion. Thus, the element of “election” would have been excluded. The second step could 
have been to insert respectively drafted force majeure clause into the contract and allocate 
the risks accordingly. This case obviates importance of precise contractual regulation, as 
well as importance of force majeure clauses in the commercial contracts.123 Force majeure 
clauses and its legal effect will be discussed in details in Chapter 3 of this thesis.  
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Similarly, in Maritime National Fish v Ocean Trawlers124 charterers of a trawler, which 
could be used only with an otter trawl, claimed to be discharged on the ground that the 
license needed for the use has not been granted. The licensing requirement was in force at 
the time of contracting, however due to the change of government policy charterers 
obtained only three out of five licenses. Frustration was considered to be self-induced since 
it was due to the election of the defendant not to nominate the chartered vessel for the 
license.   
 
Frustration will be considered as self-induced, when event, which makes performance of 
the contract impossible was caused by the party's breach of the charter.125 In Monarch 
Steamship v. Karlshamns Oljefabriker,126 frustration was self-induced due to the owner's 
breach of the seaworthiness obligation. In Ocean Tramp Tankers Corporation v V/O 
Sovfracht127 for instance, charterers could not rely on the trapping of the ship in the Suez 
Canal as the cause of frustrating the charter because they were in breach of the War Clause 
by sending the ship in the canal. 
 
2.4.2 Foreseen and Foreseeable Events 
 
Frustrating event must be neither foreseen, nor foreseeable by the parties.  In order to iden-
tify whether foreseeability will exclude the doctrine of frustration, the following three fac-
tors have to be considered: degree of foreseeability, extent of foreseeability and whether it 
was the intention of the parties or one of the parties to assume the risk of its occurrence.128 
For inferring such risk-assumption it is necessary to demonstrate, that not only the super-
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vening event as such, but also its consequences or effects on the contract were foreseea-
ble.129 
 
In W J Tatem Ltd v Gamboa,130 a charterparty was frustrated due to the detention of the 
ship. This outcome was determined by the fact that it was not foreseeable that the ship 
would be detained not only for the period of the charter, but also for a long period thereaf-
ter, making the extent of the detention unforeseeable.  
 
If the parties foresaw the event but made only partial provision for it, than it will be consid-
ered that they did not assume the risk for the event. This is the reason why in the Bank Line 
v Arthur Capel & Co131 a charterparty was frustrated by the requisition of the ship even 
though the parties had foreseen that event and had actually made provision for it in the con-
tract.   
 
Foreseeability is another factor that excludes application of the doctrine. The event shall 
not be within the contemplation of the parties at the time of entry into the contract.132 The 
difficulty in this case is to identify what is and what is not foreseeable at the moment of the 
contracting.133 Certain events are foreseeable in the sense that one can be aware that they 
may take place, however the degree of certainty that this event will occur and affect the 
particular agreement must be assessed in relation to each particular case and will be the 
question of evaluation by the courts.134  
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And lastly, when foreseeability is alleged, it is important to consider the “nature of the ser-
vice involved and the nature and extent of the consequences of the intervening events.”135 
In Edwinton Commercial Corporation and Global Tradeways Ltd v Tsavliris Russ,136 one 
of the decisive factors against the charterers’ claim of frustration was that the ship had been 
chartered for salvage services and this carried with it the risk that had materialized, namely 
that the port authorities might have detained the chartered ship for obtaining security in 
respect of claims relating to the initial casualty.137 
  
2.4.3 Express Provision for the Frustrating Event 
 
If parties expressly provide for the frustrating event in the contract, the question is whether 
the occurred event is more fundamental than that contemplated by the parties.138 Thus, the 
issue of interpretation arises to identify whether the clause is complete and is of all-
embracing character.139 
 
In Pacific Phosphate Company, Ltd. v. Empire Transport Company, Ltd.,140 a contract was 
made in 1913 according to which ship owners undertook to provide charterers with certain 
vessels in each of the years 1914 to 1918. The parties agreed that if war broke out 
shipments might at the option of either party be suspended until the end of hostilities. After 
the start of the World War I, court held that the contract was discharged, as the suspension 
clause was not intended by the parties to cover war of such catastrophic nature as in fact 
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occurred.141 Consequently, the fact that the event may have been contemplated by the 
parties or even anticipated at the time the contract was entered into will not exclude the 
application of the doctrine, unless the parties have made complete provision for it to fully 
cover the different circumstances, which have arisen.142 
 
Based on the above, it can be concluded, that when parties allege the contract to be 
frustrated as a result of the impossibility, delay or interruption, or any other cause, 
provisions of the charterparty shall be examined in their context whether they are 
sufficiently wide to deal with the new development. If they are not, and in practice few will 
be sufficiently wide to cover the situation so radical as to cause frustration - then they will 
not prevent frustration.143 This principle is established in Fibrosa Spolka v Fairbairn,144 by 
the Court of Appeals and implies that: when supervening events render the performance of 
a contract impossible, and there is no undertaking by the parties to bear risk for such event, 
contract will be frustrated notwithstanding the fact that the parties may have expressly 
provided for the clause dealing with the interruption. 
 
Such express provisions, dealing with the frustrating event can be drafted in the form of a 
force majeure clause. Legal effect of such clauses, as well as their interrelation with the 
doctrine of frustration will be analyzed in Chapter 3 of this study. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
 
As demonstrated above, the doctrine of frustration is not tailored to satisfy the needs of 
commercial parties in modern world for the following two main reasons: firstly, the thresh-
old for invoking the doctrine of frustration is rather high; and secondly, the legal effect of 
the application of the doctrine are drastic in terms that it brings the contract automatically 
to an end, irrespective of the wishes of the parties.145  
 
With respect to the high threshold for establishing the frustration of the contract, it must be 
noted that this approach reflects the importance of commercial certainty and predictability 
in English law.146 Courts have adopted a restrictive approach to the operation of the doc-
trine in order to avoid it becoming an escape route for a party who has entered into a bad 
bargain.147 
 
The, limits of the doctrine can be summarized as immediately follows below:148  
 
Doctrine does not apply where the event was foreseen or foreseeable. Frustration may not 
be invoked where express provision has been made in the contract for the event that is al-
leged to have frustrated the contract. Contracting party cannot claim frustration of the con-
tract where the alleged frustrating event was caused by his own conduct, act or omission, 
rather than a supervening event. The cases regarding the delay and self-induced frustration 
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require multi-factorial assessment by the courts, their outcome largely depends on the par-
ticular circumstances of the case, causing uncertainty and inconsistency.149  
 
As to the legal consequences of frustration, in case of occurrence of unforeseen events, the 
parties would often prefer to have their obligations under the contract suspended or modi-
fied to adjust to the changed circumstances, rather than treat the contract as discharged al-
together. Doctrine of frustration is thus rather inflexible in this respect. 
 
Having analyzed the harshness and impracticability of the doctrine of frustration under 
English law, it needs to be further assessed whether there are any mechanisms available for 
the parties to the contract to avoid application of the doctrine and if so, what is interrelation 
between these mechanisms and the doctrine of frustration. 
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3 Contractual Provisions for Supervening Events 
 
The starting point for determining whether the contract has been frustrated must be the 
terms of the contract itself.150 This is because, firstly, it is necessary to ascertain the extent 
of the contractual obligations in order to decide whether performance in the changed cir-
cumstances is radically different from the obligations initially assumed; and secondly, it 
must be ascertained whether the contract makes provision for the events, which have oc-
curred.151 If the contract does make the provision for that event, then it is the contract that 
will regulate the impact of the event on the contractual obligations of the parties. In other 
words, party will be able to rely on contractual remedy as opposed to claiming discharge 
under the common law. 
 
As already indicated above, the effect of the doctrine of frustration is radical. It 
automatically brings the contract to an end. Parties however, might want to avoid such 
drastic consequence of the doctrine, or on the contrary, want to be excused from 
performing their contractual obligations in the situations when they cannot rely on the 
frustration doctrine.152 Therefore, they may provide express provisions in the contract 
either for the specific obstacles to performance or for such obstacles in general in force 
majeure clauses and define the effects of the supervening events on their rights and 
obligations.153 
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This chapter firstly defines the concept of force majeure. Secondly, the effect of the force 
majeure clauses on the contractual rights and obligations of the parties and interrelation of 
such clauses with the frustration doctrine is analyzed in details.  
 
 
3.1 Concept of Force Majeure 
 
The concept of force majeure is alien to common law, however it is an established doctrine 
in civil law jurisdictions (Italy, France, Norway, Germany)154and can be defined as follows:  
 
"Force majeure occurs when the law recognizes that without default of either party a 
contractual obligation has become incapable of being performed because the 
circumstances in which the performance is called for would render it impossible. I 
promised to do this but I cannot due to some irresistible unforeseeable and uncontrollable 
event."155 
 
Thus, in civil law jurisdictions force majeure constitutes an excuse of performance even in 
the absence of an express contractual provision.156 As for the force majeure clause, it seeks 
to anticipate eventualities that might arise after the contract is concluded and settle the allo-
cation of risks beforehand in an agreed, rather than imposed manner. The scope of the con-
tractual force majeure clause can be broader than that provided in the relevant statute. For 
that reason, force majeure clauses are common elements of commercial contracts both in 
civil law and common law jurisdictions.157 
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3.1.1 Force Majeure in French Law 
 
Force majeure as a concept exists in the common law only to the extent that is incorporated 
into a contract by the parties. The doctrine has French origin and plays a central part in the 
structure of contractual liability in French law.158 It sets limit to the strict liability and is 
applied by the courts, if the event is a) irresistible, b) unforeseeable, and c) external to the 
debtor, and d) makes performance impossible and not merely more onerous or difficult.159 
 
As it can be seen from the above, to invoke a defence of force majeure the debtor 
(promisor) must show that performance has been made impossible and not merely more 
onerous. In this respect force majeure corresponds with the English law doctrine of 
frustration.160 Where the French law differs, however is in the rule that physical or legal 
impossibility alone is sufficient to apply this defence by French courts. Thus, it is not 
relevant whether the event substantially and radically alters parties’ contractual rights and 
obligations.161 
 
Another factor that shall be outlined is that civil judge, faced with the issue of qualifying an 
event as a force majeure event, may resort to the “statutory” definition of the force majeure 
event, thus the elements for its qualification will be provided by the background law.162 
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3.1.2 Force Majeure in English Law 
 
It was through the doctrine of frustration, that common law developed its own remedy to 
deal with events that affect the basic economics of the contracts. Although, there is no 
general doctrine of force majeure in English law, parties often incorporate force majeure 
clauses in their contracts, thus English courts have to deal with these clauses and interpret 
them accordingly.163  
 
Therefore, questions that need to be analyzed are: the effect of the force majeure clauses on 
the obligations of the parties, relation of this clause to the frustration doctrine, the legal 
nature of the force majeure clauses, how the force majeure clauses are construed by the 
courts. 
 
For identifying the effect of the force majeure clauses in particular on the charterparties, 
the courts have to assess whether the occurred events or event falls within the scope of the 
said clause.164This largely depends on the wording of the clause and its interpretation by 
the courts. Therefore, brief overview regarding the construction of time charterparty terms 
will be provided.  
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3.2 Construing Terms in Time Charterparties 
 
3.2.1 Effect of the Contractual Clauses  
 
As already noted earlier, it is not possible for the parties to draft fully self-regulatory con-
tract, which is completely isolated from the governing law.165 For instance, many of the 
force majeure clauses describe supervening events as events beyond the control of the par-
ties that may not be foreseen or reasonably overcome. This definition has to be interpreted 
in accordance with the applicable law, namely questions such as what is deemed to be be-
yond the control of one party, whether it is sufficient to prove that a party has been diligent 
and has acted in good faith, etc. Thus, two clauses with exactly the same wording might 
have different legal effects due to their interpretation.166 
 
Furthermore, legal consequences of force majeure vary from a judicial adjustment for the 
altered circumstances to termination of the contract or suspension of the contractual obliga-
tions.167 Civil law judge will check and apply the statutory effects of the force majeure 
event if parties omit such regulation in the clause.  Common law judge, on the other hand 
will rely on the wording of the clause and apply principles of contact interpretation to iden-
tify the effects of the event.  
 
Considering all above, if parties include the force majeure clause in the charterparty and 
subject it to the English law, coordination of such clause with the canons of interpretation 
of the governing law is necessary.168  
 
                                                
 
165 Boilerplate Clauses, International Commercial Contracts and the Applicable Law, 116–117. 
166 Ibid., 52. 
167 Fontaine, Drafting International Contracts, 439–451; THEO RAUH, “Legal Consequences of Force 
Majeure Under German, Swiss, English and United States’ Law” 25:1 (1996): 152. 
168 Boilerplate Clauses, International Commercial Contracts and the Applicable Law, 116–117. 
 37 
3.2.2 Canons of Interpretation 
 
Having demonstrated the relevance of the governing law on the effect of the contractual 
clauses and in particular force majeure clauses, canons of interpretation relevant for time 
charterparties shall be addressed below. 
 
Although, standard charterparty forms are extensively used in the maritime industry, the 
parties usually amend these standard contracts throughout the negotiation.169 In case of 
conflict between the standard charterparty clauses and privately negotiated provisions, 
there is a presumption favoring the latter,170 as they are considered to more accurately re-
flect the presumed intention of the parties.171 
 
As it is argued in the legal literature, judges are inclined to the literal interpretation of char-
terparty terms. Nevertheless, most cannons of interpretation shall be considered relevant for 
interpreting charterparties.172 
 
One of the most important canons of interpretation relevant for the scope of the present 
study is ejusdem generis rule. This cannon of construction, “limits the literal wide meaning 
of general words if they are following particular words and phrases having common char-
acteristic.” For instance in case Andre & Cie v Orient Shipping Rotterdam BV173 while de-
termining what constituted off-hire event, it was held that expression “any other cause” 
must be construed ejusdem generis with the preceding list of incidents named in the clause 
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and entirely external cause like the interference of authorities, did not exempt charterer 
from paying hire.  Furthermore, the same approach was followed in case Stag Line v. Fos-
colo Mango.174 However, parties are free to exclude application of ejusdem generis rule in 
their agreement.175 
 
This might be particularly important for construing force majeure clauses. Force majeure 
clauses often include general, non-specified events such as “any other similar cause beyond 
the reasonable control of either party”.176 This type of general language is quite common 
in charter parties and “often invites for litigation or arbitration”.177 This can be avoided by 
specifying the events covered by the force majeure clause. 
 
Nevertheless, even if the relevant contractual clause is drafted in rather detailed manner, 
literal construction of such clause will have certain interpretative limits.  House of Lords in 
Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society introduced the 
basic principle that interpretation of commercial contract must reflect commercial common 
sense. Main aspect of this principle can be summarized as follows:  if the contract as con-
strued by applying “ordinary language and rules of syntax” would lead to unreasonable 
result, the assumption must be made that the parties cannot have intended it, thus one have 
to use commercially sensible construction.178 Good illustration of this principle is also the 
case Metropolitan Water Board v Dick Kerr and Co Ltd,179which will be discussed in more 
details below.  
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Based on the above, it can be concluded that charterparties must be construed in a commer-
cially sensible manner. Thus, courts will interpret the literal meaning of the words in light 
of the commercial purpose of the contract, policy behind this being desired uniformity in 
charterparty interpretation180 and efficient functioning of the shipping market.181 
 
 
3.3 Force Majeure Clauses 
 
Force majeure clauses vary from simply drafted clauses to the clauses of rather complex 
structure. Furthermore, apart from the classic force majeure clauses operating only when 
performance is prevented, more developed ones may apply if performance becomes 
onerous or even uneconomic. In this case, rather than merely excluding liability, such 
clause provides for an extension of the time for performance and other adjustments to a 
party's contractual obligations.182  
 
The flexibility of such clauses implies an answer to the question of why parties 
nevertheless incorporate a force majeure clause in their contract when the English law 
recognizes frustration as a defence against the claims for non-performance of contractual 
obligations. Frustration, apart from being relatively uncertain concept, has the very severe 
effect of bringing the contract automatically to an end. Upon occurrence of a frustrating 
event, both parties are relieved from liability for failure to perform future obligations 
arising under the contract.183 A suitably drafted force majeure clause, on the other hand, 
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may consider the outcome which is more favorable for the both parties, with the possibility 
of extensions of time being granted to the promisor, suspension or alteration of the contract 
in certain events, return of sums already paid and, as a last resort, termination of the 
contract.184 
 
Moreover, the force majeure clause can also relieve a party from liability should his 
performance of the contract be prevented by an event beyond his control which does not, 
however, frustrate the contract. The case of particular importance demonstrating practical 
significance of force majeure clauses is the Court of Appeal case Lauritzen A.S. v 
Wijsmuller B.V, Super Servant Two,185 as already discussed above in this study. As 
mentioned above, the respondents had to transport oil-drilling rig using one of their two 
ships Super Servant One or Super Servant Two. They selected Super Servant Two to 
perform the voyage.  However, the selected ship sunk while performing another contract. 
In the view of the Court of Appeal, alleged frustrating event was caused by their own act – 
the choice to perform voyage with Super Servant Two. Therefore the charterers were 
precluded from relying on the frustration doctrine.  
 
Reasoning of the court in this case also addresses the issue whether the defendants where 
entitled to rely on the cancellation clause and terminate the charterparty. Proper definition 
of the scope of the clause required interpreting it in the context of the whole contract. Court 
of Appeal concluded that notwithstanding that the cancellation right was exercisable in 
wide range of circumstances, it did exclude liability for negligence. Thus, defendants 
would be able to rely on the cancellation clause only if non-performance was not due to 
their negligence.  Present case demonstrates that the courts are unlikely to conclude, in the 
absence of very clear words, that a force majeure clause will encompass events caused by 
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the negligence of the party relying upon the clause.186 The House of Lords in Alghussein 
Establishment v. Eton College have further confirmed this view.187 Therefore, although 
parties were precluded to rely on the doctrine of frustration in Auritzen A.S. v. Wijsmuller 
B.V., they would be able to rely on the force majeure clause to avoid the contractual 
liability if the loss of the Super Servant Two occurred without the negligence of the 
defendants.188  
 
In many ways the narrowness of the doctrine of frustration can be explained on the basis 
that it is up to the parties to protect their legal position by suitably drafted force majeure 
clause.189 Yet, it is this flexibility which makes it difficult to define meaning and effects of 
the force majeure clause and there is also a risk that too widely drawn force majeure clause 
may be deprived of its legal effect as it might be held void for uncertainty.190  
 
3.3.1 Nature of the Force Majeure Clauses 
 
The question whether the force majeure clause is type of the exclusion clause is important 
because interpretation of the force majeure clause depends on this matter.191 Namely, the 
issue of interest is whether the strict rules of construction applicable to exclusion clauses 
shall apply.192 The strict rules of interpretation imply that if it is not possible to choose 
between two or more meanings that the contractual language could convey, then, as a 
principle of last resort, the meaning restricting most the scope of the exclusion of liability 
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under the clause is to be adopted.193 This view is confirmed by reasoning of Lord Diplock 
in Photo Production v. Securicor.194 
 
Judicial approach favors the view that exclusion clauses act as a defence to a breach.195 As 
for the force majeure clauses, they are considered to define the obligation assumed, rather 
than excuse or limit the consequences of breach. Thus, force majeure clause operates to 
“prevent what otherwise might be a breach from being a breach.”196 Although there is 
uniform view in the legal literature about the nature of the clause, there is no uniform 
judicial opinion about interpretation method of the force majeure clauses, in some cases 
narrow construction of the clause may be favored.197 
 
To sum up, force majeure clauses are not exclusion clauses. Exclusion clauses limit the 
extent of the obligation assumed by the party. Whereas, in case of force majeure clause, 
non-performance is not a breach only because no performance was due in the 
circumstances stipulated by the said clause.198 There is no uniform approach regarding 
interpretation of the force majeure clause. 
 
3.3.2 Operation of the Force Majeure Clauses 
 
Operation of the force majeure clause depends on two factors. Firstly, the wording of the 
clause and its interpretation is of a particular importance to find whether the event occurred 
falls within the scope of the clause. Secondly, the requirement of causation has to be 
satisfied.  
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The issue of interpretation of the clause and its interrelation with the governing law has 
been already discussed above. The following section, will address certain elements that 
parties to the contract are advised to take into consideration while drafting the force 
majeure clauses. These elements to be contained in the well-drafted force majeure clause 
have been enlisted in legal doctrine as follows: the definitions of the event, list of specific 
events, obligations as to reporting and the effect of the event. 199 
 
Furthermore, when referring to the “acts of authority” which are often included in the force 
majeure clause, these acts are advised to cover specific acts (or non-acts) of a non-
legislative nature, such as withdrawal of the license or the grant of a license but on terms 
difficult or costly to comply with.200  
 
If parties are willing to effectively invoke the force majeure defence in cases of the strike, 
it is suggested that the clause shall also cover consequences of the strike. Consideration 
behind this suggestion is that force majeure situation may end the moment the strike is 
settled, whereas the disruption caused by the strike may still prevent a party from resuming 
work under the contract.201 
 
If event occurs which clearly falls within the wording of the clause, the party invoking the 
clause must demonstrate that the event envisaged by the force majeure clause was the 
cause of delay in performing of the contract.202 If non-performance is attributable to two 
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events, of which only one falls within the force majeure clause, it will be sufficient to 
demonstrate that the event was the dominant and proximate cause of non-performance.203  
 
3.3.3 Circumstances Existing at the Date of the Contract 
 
Unlike frustration, Force majeure can still be relied upon even when the event preventing 
performance operated at the date of the contract.204 Perhaps Navrom v. Callistis Ship 
Management S.A.,205 although concerning the voyage charterparties, is a good illustration 
of this approach. The court allowed the parties to invoke the force majeure defence due to 
the congestion in the port, notwithstanding the fact that the congestion had been in 
existence when the charter was entered into.  
 
As indicated above, according to the French law, one of the necessary elements of force 
majeure is that event must not be reasonably foreseeable for the relevant party. Force 
majeure has more general meaning in English law not necessarily conveying the French 
element of foreseeability of the doctrine. Suggestion is made that it is more a question of 
causation: whether the occurrence of a particular peril, which could have been foreseen, 
can really be said to have caused one party's failure to perform.206  
 
3.4 Comparative Assessment of Force Majeure and Frustration  
 
As already discussed above, frustration is a doctrine, which operates within very narrow 
confines under English law. Its judicial base is unclear and the consequences of its 
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invocation are harsh. To eliminate the harshness of this doctrine and for the sack of 
predictability and legal certainty, commercial parties are inclined to use contractual risk 
allocation clauses, such as force majeure clause. Although English law does not recognize 
a notion of force majeure, as such, force majeure clauses have become increasingly 
significant component of many commercial contracts and still remain the issue of 
assessment by English courts.207 
 
Many standard form contracts, including charterparties may incorporate force majeure 
clause and subject the agreement to English law. Therefore, assessment of the relationship 
between force majeure clauses and the English law doctrine of frustration is important. 
Namely, it has to be identified whether the presence of a force majeure accords with the 
doctrine of frustration and whether such clause in a contract can supplement the operation 
of the doctrine of frustration. Furthermore, it is also important to identify what advantages 
the incorporation of suitably drafted force majeure clause can bring, as opposed to 
invoking the doctrine of frustration. 
 
The presence of the force majeure clause in a contract does not, of itself, exclude the 
operation of the doctrine of frustration.208 The important issue here is whether provision 
was made for an event causing the performance to be radically different from that 
undertaken by the contract.209 As it is stated in Davis Contractors Ltd v. Fareham Urban 
District Council: “[t]he question is whether the contract […] is, on its true construction, 
wide enough to apply to the new situation: if it is not, then it is at an end.”210 
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With the same token, in Fibrosa Spolka v Fairbairn,211 Court of Appeals established the 
rule, that when supervening events render the performance of a contract impossible, and 
there is no undertaking by the parties to bear risk for such event, contract will be frustrated, 
notwithstanding the fact that the parties may have expressly provided for the clause dealing 
with the event.  
 
Force majeure clause may be relied upon as evidence that the parties have made express 
provision for the alleged frustrating event or at least that the event was one which was 
within their reasonable contemplation at the time of entry into the contract. Contract is not 
frustrated where express provision has been made in the contract for the alleged frustrating 
event,212 or where the event was foreseen or was foreseeable by the parties at the time of 
entry into the contract.213 Frustrating event is a supervening, unforeseen event and not an 
event, which has been anticipated in the contract itself.214 Therefore, the relevant party will 
be able to resort to the remedies for the breach of the contract and not bear the 
consequences of the frustration. 
 
It is suggested in the legal literature, that greater the magnitude of the event, the less likely 
it is that it will be encompassed within a general clause.215 In Metropolitan Water Board v 
Dick Kerr and Co Ltd,216 contractors where required to stop the construction works due to 
the order of the Government. House of Lord took the view that magnitude of the delay took 
it outside the scope of the quite broad exemption clause (which entitled contractor for 
extension of the time in case of the undue delay in the performance), notwithstanding the 
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use of the words “whatsoever and howsoever occasioned” and stated that contract was 
frustrated. On the same reasoning, a force majeure clause which includes in the list of force 
majeure events “strikes”, as a matter of interpretation, not to cover a national strike or 
general strike.  
 
It is therefore extremely difficult if not impossible to draft a force majeure clause, which 
shuts out the doctrine of frustration completely. This is because even the widest of clauses 
may be held not to cover a particular catastrophic event. Furthermore, there might be some 
considerations when dealing with the scope of the clause, such as: force majeure clause, 
which provides extension of time as its legal effect may indicate to the court that the scope 
of the clause is confined to temporary interruptions in performance.217 
 
On the other hand, it may be possible to argue that, where the parties are of equal 
bargaining power, the courts should be more prepared to conclude that a clause which 
expressly covers “delays whatsoever and howsoever” occasioned, covers even a delay 
caused by the most catastrophic of events. In other words, the courts might give up their 
restrictive rules of construction and subject force majeure clauses to a more natural 
construction when dealing with parties having equal bargaining power.218 
 
Although doctrine of frustration is of respective antiquity, it is nevertheless a doctrine the 
limits of which are difficult to define. Judicial basis of frustration has long been a source of 
debate and it has been criticized in theory for being artificial, harsh and inflexible.219 Thus, 
it is unlikely to predict with any degree of certainty the circumstances in which the courts 
will invoke it. Uncertainty is therefore inherent to the doctrine of frustration. This 
uncertainty can, however be eliminated to a large extent by the incorporation into a contract 
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of a suitably drafted force majeure clause. The clause can specify the circumstances in 
which it is to operate and the role of the court is then reduced to the interpretation of the 
clause.220 
 
Force majeure clause offers the parties opportunity to escape from the narrowness of the 
doctrine by including in the clause the event, which would not at common law be sufficient 
to frustrate the agreement.221 
 
Frustration operates automatically, irrespective of the wishes of the parties. It also makes it 
impossible for the parties to negotiate after the event. Automatic nature of the doctrine can 
be avoided by carefully drafted force majeure clause, which clearly sets out the 
consequences of the occurrence of a force majeure event.222 
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4 Concluding Remarks 
 
The doctrine of frustration evolved to mitigate the rule on literal performance of absolute 
promises. The doctrine is “an expedient to escape from injustice where such would result 
from enforcement of a contract in its literal terms after a significant change of 
circumstances […].''223 The foregoing study demonstrated that, while trying to give effect 
to the demands of the justice, the courts have adopted a restrictive approach to the 
operation of the doctrine by keeping it within very narrow limits with rather high threshold 
for invoking it. 
 
While discussing the causes of frustration, this study showed that none of the causes would 
be sufficient to constitute frustration unless changed circumstances "go to the root of the 
contract."224 Delay and interruption in the charter service, strike and war, impossibility of 
performance - all of these events have to frustrate common venture of the charterer and the 
shipowner. Heavier financial burden, onerousness of the obligations will not be sufficient 
to affect “basic economics” of the contract.  
 
Such restrictive approach to the doctrine is due to various considerations under English 
law. Commercial certainty and predictability is the basic principle of the English law of 
contract.225 English approach is that the doctrine ought not to be an escape route from 
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“normal consequences of imprudent commercial bargains.”226 Parties have to bear the risks 
if they do not protect their interests through contractual regulation.227 
 
Another consideration is radical effect of the doctrine, which is why courts refrain from 
easily invoking it. Frustration immediately and automatically brings a contract and the 
obligations of the parties to an end. The fact that the parties may have treated the contract 
as continuing after a frustrating event will not prevent the operation of the doctrine.228 
Parties, especially those involved in long commercial relations, would often prefer to adjust 
the contract to the changed circumstances, therefore doctrine of frustration is rather 
impractical in terms of adjustment to particular commercial needs of the parties.  
 
Present analyses also demonstrated that the main problem of the doctrine has been its 
application in actual cases and for this reason the doctrine has been subject of considerable 
confusion and uncertainty.229 There is no uniform standard applicable to the cases of 
frustration, whether or not a particular event is capable of causing frustration of the contract 
is the question to be determined based upon the facts of the case and contractual regulation 
between the parties. Thus, assessment of the facts of the case "often [...] will be a question 
of degree [... ] and  [..] where questions of degree are involved, opinions may and often 
legitimately […] differ."230 What complicates the matter more, for instance in cases of 
delays and interruptions, length and effect of these events must be assessed at the time 
when they occur, which requires certain degree of speculation by the courts.   
 
It is uncertain whether a specific event will lead to frustrating the contract. Uncertainty and 
inflexibility in application of the doctrine, as well as its radical affects on the contract 
                                                
 
226 Pioneer Shipping Ltd v BTP Tioxide Ltd (The Nema) (House of Lords 1982). 
227 Comptoir Commercial Anversois v Power, Son & Co. (King’s Bench 1920). 
228 Time Charters, para. 26.6; Hirji Mulji v Cheong Yue Steamship Co (Court of Appeals 1926). 
229 Liu, “The Doctrine of Frustration: An Overview of English Law,” 262. 
230 Pioneer Shipping Ltd v BTP Tioxide Ltd (The Nema) (House of Lords 1982). 
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hinders commercial certainty and predictability, which is particularly crucial for the parties 
involved in shipping. By incorporating force majeure clauses, parties have the ability to 
deal with the anticipated changed circumstances in the way that is acceptable to their 
commercial needs.231 Firstly, parties can avoid the operation of the doctrine by 
incorporating force majeure clause, which fully embraces the potential frustrating event. 
Secondly, parties might be willing to bring their contractual relations to an end in certain 
circumstances, which by itself may not be sufficient to bring the doctrine of frustration into 
operation. All the above can be achieved by respectively drafted force majeure clause, 
which is a valuable mechanism to allocate risks between the counterparties.  
 
The thesis also discussed the importance of the well-drafted risk allocation clauses. The 
study showed that while drafting the force majeure clauses, parties must take due 
consideration of the limitations and interpretations to which force majeure clauses are 
subject under the law governing the transaction. A failure properly to account for such 
matters in the contract could result in the affected party being solely reliant on the limited 
relief available under the common law doctrine of frustration.232  
 
Parties are free to decide what events they want to be considered to be force majeure events 
within their contractual relationship. Most importantly, the freedom of contract may go as 
far as to include in the spectrum of force majeure event even negligent acts of the parties or 
impracticability of performance, including increased financial burden. Thus, wording of the 
clause will define application, effect and scope of force majeure. Given that the parties 
agree on the legal consequences of force majeure events beforehand, such risk allocation 
clauses maximize the protection of contracting parties and minimize the likelihood of 
unintended consequences.233  
                                                
 
231 Ibid. 
232 Chevallier- Boutell, “Use of Force Majeure as a Risk Allocation Mechanism in the Context of 
International Project Finance,” 15–16. 
233 Ibid., 113. 
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Importance of the well-drafted force majeure clause is evidenced by the fact that 
International Chamber of Commerce issued ICC Force Majeure Clause 2003, to facilitate 
the drafting process for the commercial parties and help them to take unforeseeable 
circumstances into account.234 It is noteworthy, that SUPPLYTIME 2005 force majeure 
clause has been amended to make it more consistent with the structure and provisions of 
the ICC Force Majeure Clause 2003. 
 
In light of the above, when subjecting their contract to English law, parties must always be 
mindful of the legal consequences an applicable law may bring in their contractual 
relationship. Given the need for predictability in any commercial dealing, and in particular 
in shipping industry, parties can and should eliminate undesired and unexpected results of 
application of harsh doctrinal rules by respective contractual arrangements. By means of 
fully utilizing freedom of contracts, commercial parties can achieve considerable degree of 
legal certainty as to the consequences of unforeseen events on their legal relationship 
through properly designed risk allocation clauses.  
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